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Abstract 
I 1 a ~he U.s scheduled airline industry has 
been involved in the largest re-equipment program in its 
history. This program which is still continuing involves the 
addition of hundreds of new wide-body and other aircraft to 
the airline fleet. Capital expenditures for the twelve major 
airlines alone during the past two years have amounted to 
nearly $4 billion. As of June 1. 1972. the U.s. scheduled 
airlines had orders for 243 aircraft for delivery in 1972 and 
beyond. The requirements for new aircraft and ground support 
equipment have come at a time when the industry has experienced 
very adverse financial conditions. The costs associated with 
the purchase of this new equipment along with the other costs 
involving such matters as the environment and security are 
presenting the carriers with significant financial challenges. 
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=19730024127 2020-03-17T09:39:39+00:00Z
One of the problems in trying to forecast the capital 
requi~ements for the air transport industry, is that we have to 
make many assumptions. We try to put together the best assumptions 
and even then there can be a number of errors, and as you will 
see as we go through this series of slides, some of the assumptions 
are quite sensitive to the results. I will try to identify those 
and indicate to you how sensitive they may be. 
This is a two part program this morning. I'm going to try 
to show what the needs are in the industry and then Don Lloyd-
Jones will tell you how easy it is to raise the money to meet 
those needs. 
Looking at the first slide. Now, all I'm trying to show here 
is the methodology and then to show you in very gross terms, what 
steps we took, and then some of the data we try to rely on as we 
made the forecast. 
You have to begin with attempting to anticipate what the 
level of traffic growth would be in the period, in this case, be-
tween 1972 to 1980, and then give the traffic growth, as well as 
try to indicate what the present capacity is; and what the future 
capacity is likely to be; and the measurement of that capacity 
against the traffic growth, and some indication of the load factor 
that might be involved in the time period will give you then an 
idea of how much additional capacity you might need. From this 
35.1 
- 2 -
cost estimate of capacity need you can figure out your capital , 
requirements. 
On the traffic side, there are a number of groups which have 
made forecasts of airline traffic growth, throughout this period 
of 1972 to 1980 or even to 1985, and some even go out to the year 
2000. What we have done, of course, within the industry itself is 
our own forecasts which we have developed in the last three or 
four years and have had one revision in that regard. 
Now, if you just take the passenger growth from 1972 to 1980. 
One group that has forecast in this area is the FAA. They indi-
cated about 10 ~/o per year average annual growth in our domestic 
revenue passenger miles. The aviation Advisory Commission has 
worked with the figure of about 10% per year. Sam Brown from 
the Civil Aeronautics Board is giving a speech in Milwaukee today 
in which he will indicate that the figure for the CAB is approxi-
mately ~/o per year average annual growth over this time period. 
Now you see on this second slide the ATA forecast. The top 
figure that you see for domestic passenger growth average annual 
from 1972 to 1980 is 8.8% per year. The figure that we are using 
falls somewhere in this spectrum but more on the low side perhaps 
with CAB's at ~/o, and to ourselves 8.~/o, and to Aviation Advisory 
commission's at about 10% and the FAA about 10 ~/O. We are using 
our figure because we did it. And we have,through a committee 
composed of as many as a hundred representative personnel from 
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the various carriers working two or three years hammering out 
this particular forecast and carne up with S.S%. So it is not 
the figure that is identified just with the staff of ATA, but 
with the industry as a whole. At the same time, the international 
passenger growth figure they used is 12.4%. The domestic cargo 
at 16.3% and the international cargo at 15.9%. The aggregate of 
this in terms of revenue ton mile growth will actually give you 
a figure of average annual growth of 10.5%. 
Let me try to show you what the S.~/o per year means between 
1970-19S0. We have 95 billion passenger-miles in 1970, 144 by 
1975 and 220 billion by 19S0. So we are talking on the level of 
one and a half fold increase from '70 to '75 and about 2.3 fold 
increase from '70 to 'SO between 95 and 220 billions. If you used 
the S% figure that the CAB was using, they will have 2.2 fold 
increase between '70 and 'SO. So our figure is not too far 
away from this. In terms of enplaning passengers, this S.~/o 
per year domestic passenger growth that we have, would have 149 
million passengers as a base in 1970, 214 by 1975, and 325 million 
by 19S0. 
So the ratio here is slightly less than the 1.5 and 2.3 
from '70 to 'SO which is largely do to forecast the increase in 
length of haul. So we're actually cutting down the number of 
passengers relative to the increase in revenue passenger miles. 
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still though, you have 65 million more passengers in 1975 
than you have in 1970. We have another 175 million more in 1980 
over 1970. In other words, the increment of 175 million is actually 
greater than 149 million that you were carrying in 1970. 
This 325 million is a lot of passengers, and all we are 
working at is an 8.8% growth which is not too far out of line. 
Given some of our growth factors in the latter part of the '60's 
which ranged as high as 1~1o to 20% in certain years and given the 
performance that we have had this year so far which is bordering 
on the level of about 11%, it seems very high compared with 1970. 
In 1971 we alE showing a nearly flat growth, no change over 1970 
however. Now, if we return to the particular methodology that we 
were talking about, we now have the traffic on one side and what 
we attempt to do now, given this traffic growth of 8.8% per year 
or the 10 ~Io revenue ton mile figure when you make the composite 
with passenger and cargo, and domestic and international. We now 
try to measure against what the present fleet is, take out the 
anticipated retirements to get a net figure on that, add the 
planned additions that the carriers' plans show, and determine 
whether or not that is enough to carry that particular traffic 
at a particular load factor. And that if it does not we will 
have to go out to purchase some additional ATMs (available ton 
miles) in order to provide sufficient capacity to carry that 
amount of traffic, as you have just seen, something on the order 
of 325 million passengers by 1980. We get the information on the 
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present fleet and the planned additions from two sources at this 
point. About 6 to 9 months ago, a comprehensive study was ob-
tained by the ATA from the carriers on their present fleet and 
anticipated plane additions up to 19BO, for environmental purposes, 
particularly with regard to anticipating the need for noise retro-
fit. And then each year, we get from the carriers, sometimes 
about twice a year, a survey on their new equipment they plan on 
purchasing over the next two or three years. So when we combine 
these two, we are able to get a figure within this block, if you 
will, to tell us what the capacity the carriers are planning over 
this time period at this time. Normally, a carrier has a more 
finite plan for the next three years than they might have for 
1975 to 1980. 
Let's take a look at the present fleet and the planned ad-
ditions--the aircraft type 707, 727, 737, and so on down to DCIO, 
L 10-11 and the 747; what the inventory was in 1970, what the 
carriers are planning for 1975, what are the plans for 1980. 
Notice that a number of these are being retired. The 707, with 
an inventory of 412 in 1970, dropping to 263 by 1980 is one 
example. The 720's will be phased out by 1980. The DCB's would 
drop from 258 to 172. On the other hand, there are some others 
growing, of course. The 747 from 40 up to 173, and we didn't 
have the 3-engine wide-body in the fleet in 1970, they will grow 
to 555 by 1980. Now, if you put all this together, you end up 
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with an inventory of 2007 in 1970, 2110 in 1975, 2307 in 1980. 
So that you are adding about 300 from '70 to '80. But at the 
same time, you are retiring 458 in this process. These drops 
in 707's, 720's, DC 8's and so forth add up to 458 taken out of 
the fleet, but the addition, in the wide-bodies in particular, 
bring on additional 758. So you have a net growth of 300 in 
that time period. These do not include the new types of air-
craft -- the A300, the Concord, or even the twin-engine DC 10 
STOL. This is only the anticipated addition from the present 
aircraft that are now being manufactured. 707's will retire 149, 
720's will retire 126, DC 8's will retire 76 over the time period 
of 1970 to 1980. In addition, we have in terms of new orders of 
aircraft, 243 are actually on order as of June 1 of this year. 
And you notice that 88 of those were scheduled to delivery in 
1972, 78 next year, 52 in '74. They may have plans of adding 
additional aircraft which have not been decided yet. But as far 
as orders are concerned, as of June I, 243 have been confirmed 
and are valued in today's dollars at $4 billion. 
Now, most of these will be stretched 727 - 200's. On order 
are approximately 180 of the wide-body tri-jets: DC 10, LIOll 
and 6, at this point, 747's on order. 747's reached their peak 
of delivery last year, the DC 10's will reach peak this year, and 
L 1011 will kind of split as far as the peak of delivery is between 
'73 and '74, because of the stretch out of Rolls Royce engines. 
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What we have done then is we've taken a look at the traffic 
growth, the 8.8% passenger and 10 ~Io revenue ton mile growth, 
and taken a look at the present fleet and the planned addition 
now, and how then to consider whether or not they have plans to 
meet this particular growth pattern. 
We have to do it on a load factor assumption. So that we 
need a guideline then. Once more, incidentally, I should mention 
that throughout all of this we are attempting now to stick with 
basic forecasting that may have been done in one of the areas and 
try to remove the element of apparent judgement as much as pos-
sible. So here is the study that has lasted 2 or 3 years to give 
us that particular figure. This information is now coming from 
the surveys that ATA has done with the carriers. And what do you 
do here. Well, the one thing you can do is to assume that we 
will get the load factor standard that was laid down in the recent 
domestic passenger fare investigation by the CAB at 55%. We have 
attempted to see what would happen if this were set at 55%. But, 
on the other hand, we also said that it may be that you will reach 
a point in this growth pattern that you might even go higher than 
55% before you trigger the need for additional ATMs or additional 
capacity for a number of reasons. One of these is that the carriers 
are under severe financial situations in recent years and they 
will look for every wedge they possibly can to minimize the 
additional capital cost and the additional capacity that might 
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result from that. So, consequently, we have a triggered system 
here, that we will start ordering for more capacity at 55%, but 
we will go up to 57 ~h towards the end of the 1970's before we 
actually drew the line and said that we must have new capacity 
beyond that point. What I'm saying is if we move up of that 
55% load factor, we begin to order some, but as we get to 57 ~h, 
we hold at that. We do not allow the load factor to rise beyond 
57.5%. 
What we now have then in this figure is we get here, with 
the assumption I just gave you for a cut-off at 57.5%. We have 
today in 1970 a ton mile load factor of 44.3% and by 1980 we 
would have a ton mile load factor of approximately 55.7%. This 
is almost a 25% increase in load factor alone, in terms of this 
particular model, before you actually go out and place market 
demand for new equipment. 
As far as the principal characteristics are concerned, we 
will break it down to 2 time periods, '71 to '75 and '76 to '80. 
The domestic passenger growth we already indicated at 8.~h per 
year in '71 to '75 and '76 to '80 period, the load factor we are 
raising throughout this period from 48.5 to 55%, and from '76 to 
'80 it continues to grow from 55% to 57.5% cut-ff. The utilization 
we take at an average of 9 hours per day which is the utilization 
we were getting the '70 to '71 period, that is relati.!vely low at 
this point in time, a lot of it due to the fact that we have to 
.35E 
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cut back during the '70 to '71 recession. One can expect us 
to increase utilization as the traffic grows. So we will increase 
it about 10% or about 10 hours per day in '76-'80 period. 
Now for the seating configuration that we are using in the 
'71 to '75 period. The seating configuration that we had in the 
'70 to '71 period, that also is low. You can increase the seating 
capacity through elimination of lounges or reseating the present 
seating configuration in particularly the wide-bodies. So we 
assume that you hold the present base until this traffic grows 
to a point when you need to get additional capacity, hopefully 
without having to purchase. So you expect to expand seating 
configuration about 1974 and the expansion takes you for the 
next 3 years up to 1977, and it grows, gradually increasing from 
10 to 15% depending upon whether you are working with a 727-200 
standard jet or a wide-body 747. We use a different growth figure 
on the seating configuration depending upon the type of aircraft, 
but it runs about 10 to 15% in total. These are the characteristics 
that you are now getting in '71 to '75 and '76 to '80 period. 
You notice the various assumptions that are built in to each 
of these time periods '71 to '75, '76 to '80. Now, when you 
take all of this growth against what the carriers had planned, 
you come up with insufficient amount of capacity. You now have 
to add capacity and there are some capital costs in that and 
then you cost out what they have already planned. You added 
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the two, what they planned, what additional they will need. That 
factors out in the '71 to '75 period to a little under $6 billion 
of flight equipment alone in that 5 year period. Historically, 
we have run a factor of about 17% of our flight equipment that 
comes out in ground equipment. If we continue to use that 17% 
relationship, that's another billion dollars. And, of course, 
we have to assume that we aren't going to be able to purchase 
those in the future at the same dollar values of today. We have 
assumed a 4% per year inflation. That costs us in this time 
period another half billion dollars. So we end up with a little 
under 7 ~ billion dollars in the '71 to '75 time period. So for 
a five year basis, it is averaged at a billion and a half a year 
and that is about our present rate; we are running as high a 2.3 
billion as in the latter part of the '60's and we cut back as you 
well know. So this assumed about a billion and a half rate. 
The surprise then comes in the '76 to '80 period which as 
you see the flight equipment now goes up to $13 billion. A 
17% ground equipment would account for another $2.2 billion and 
the inflation factor accounts for $5 billion on this 4% per year. 
So now you have a total of about $20 billion in this time period. 
And, of course, almost $28 billion in the decade for 1970-1980. 
What is this compared with history? Well, interesting enough, 
the schedules airlines' capital equipment expenditures from '61 
to '65,$4 billion; from '66 to '70, $12 billion; '71 to '75, $7 
billion; '76 to '80, $20 billion. You can see the extreme cycles 
~~O 
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that are going on which is hitting the bottom in the first half' 
of the decade and hitting the peaks in the last half. The '71 to 
'75 figure is $3 B more than that from '61 to '65, and the $20 B 
for '76 to '80 is $8 B more than the $12 B for '66 to '70 period. 
It is interesting to look at this $12 B and increase it for the 
'76 to '80 period at 4% per year inflation. If you do and take 
the $12 B figure and run it up at 4% per year until you go to 
this time period, it comes up to about $19 ~ B. So in one respect 
this $20 B is only buying in constant dollars about $12 B worth 
in the '66 to '70 period. What I want to point out is, of course, 
that we have a lot of inflation to swallow in this '76 to '80 
period. 
Now, let me take the $20 B in the '76 to '80 period and break 
it down into $13 B of flight equipment without inflation; $15 B 
of flight and ground equipment without inflation, and then $20 B 
for flight and ground equipment with inflation. So the flight 
equipment alone in this time period -- $13 B is just slightly 
more than our total expenditures of $12 B in 1966 to 1970 period, 
and the $5 B of inflation between these 2 figures is actually 
greater than all of our expenditures in the period '61 to '65 
which is $4 B. So we will have to pay more for inflation before 
we can get hold of our equipment, than we pay for equipment in 
'61 to '65. 
Just how good is this forecast of capital requirements in 
1960 to 1980 of some $20 B. We have to look more or less at the 
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validity of assumptions on utilization, seating, load factor 
and traffic and retirement. We can say, as far as utilization 
of seating, since we have expected utilization up about l~h, 
and the seating configuration up between 10 to 15%, this is a 
pretty fair assumption, the rate at which you do it may be subject 
to some question. Some may feel the load factor may not get that 
high before it actually triggers the demand for equipment because 
you have that kind of growth and irregular competition among the 
carriers to get a larger share of market of capacity, before you 
get to 55% or 57 ~h load factor. The traffic may be subject to 
some question. But at this pOint, the spectrum of forecasts 
that have been done may be slightly on the low side, but the 
retirement is probaoly accurate because pressures have been put 
on to make the noise retrofit adjustment. 
To give you some idea the sensitivity of it. If the load 
factor grows from 55 to 60%, that 5% of additional load factor 
in '76 to 'SO period, this $20 B will be reduced by about $1.6 B. 
Or, if you can get another 10% of utilization, this is worth about 
$2 ~ B. If you didn't retire any of you aircraft which have been 
scheduled to retire between '76 to 'SO, that will be worth about 
$1 ~ B. If you took a combination of th~se: another 5% increase 
in load factor, and 10% increase of utilization, may be worth as 
much as $4 B. So you now have some trade-off. But even if you 
took the combination that I just indicated, worth $4 B, you stillj 
~~~ 
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have about $16 B which is a significantly large amount for air 
carriers to finance. 
You have a range in the change of cost of aircraft from 
7 ~/o to about l~/o. Certainly, there is some quality improvement 
in the aircraft itself. You can't say that it is not exactly the 
same aircraft. But still these figures are more markedly above 
the 4% we have put into the assumption; so it is very possible 
that inflation will be greater than what we have indicated. 
I would summarize by saying that it would appear to us and 
we've just now gone through this exercise and we still have some 
other adjustments that we have to make in order to shake it down 
some. I think we can conclude that the capital requirements on 
the industry in the latter half of the '70's with inflation would 
be greater than they were in the '76 to '80 period. This is going 
to put increasing pressure on the carriers to maintain an adequate 
level of earnings in order to finance themselves through this 
time period, hopefully providing an adequate public service with-
out congestion problems, and so forth as in the latter half of 
the '60's. 
